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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2-2(3)(j); UTAH CONST. Art. 0, § 0; Utah Const. Art. VIII,

§ 1; UTAH CONST. Art. VIII, § 3.
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction subsequent to the
transfer of Plaintiff s appeal effected pursuant to the pour-over statute codified at
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2a-3(j); UTAH CONST. Art. VIII, § 5.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, CASE, AND FACTS
1.

Defendants Trinity Universal Ins. Co. of Kansas, Trinity Universal Ins.

Co., and Unitrin Property and Casualty Group (hereinafter "Trinity") provided1 an
insurance to Plainitff (the "Trinity policy").
2.

The Trinity policy was issued to Plaintiff Asael Fair & Sons Company

(hereinafter "Farr" or "Plaintiff).
3.

The Trinity policy expired before Farr suffered the loss giving rise to

the claims Plaintiff submitted to the other insurer defendants.

1

Trinity Universal Insurance Company of Kansas issued the policy to Farr.
The other named defendants, though affiliated with each other, were not proper
parties. The mistaken identification was merely formalistic and immaterial. All
three defendants were granted a summary judgment.
1

4.

Fair sued Trinity for negligence.

5.

Trinity filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. (R.

1524). Reviewed for correctness.
6.

Trinity adopts the facts, statement of the case, and statement of the

issues as set forth by Plaintiff except as specified herein.

UTAH R. APP. P.

24(i).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review on an appeal from the grant or denial of a motion for
summary judgment is the same standard applied by the trial court. There are five
(5) broad steps and numerous subelements2 which vary depending on the
particular claims and defenses presented.
(1)

The Court must identify the substantive law;

(2)

The Court can determine which facts are material to a cause of action
or defense only after identifying the elements of the causes of action
and affirmative defenses;

(3)

The Court must determine which party would bear the burden of
proof at trial and identify all burden-shifting circumstances in order to
identify the stage at which a prima facie case is presented or

2

State v. Virgin. 2006 UT 29, f 16 (setting forth standard of review for
preliminary hearing and levels of review preceding application of law to fact).
2

contested;
(4)

The Court can then resolve the question as to whether there is a
genuine dispute as to any material fact; and

(5)

The Court can then, and only then, correctly apply the law to the
material facts.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Trinity was awarded a summary judgment. All claims against Trinity were
dismissed because Trinity did not owe any tort-based duties. Therefore, it could
not be comparatively at fault. The remand order, if any, should be specific and
clear in order to promote notions of judicial economy and to prevent revival of any
and all claims against Trinity under UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(b).

3

ARGUMENT
I.

THE ORDER DISMISSING ALL CLAIMS AGAINST
TRINITY WAS NOT CHALLENGED BY FARR'S
ANALYSIS.

The Trinity policy expired on May 13, 2003. Fair suffered its loss (the
"Loss") on May 29, 2003.
Based upon Trinity's compliance with Utah law requiring, among other
things, a notice of non-renewal, the expiration of the coverage period extinguished
any continuing contractual relationship. Fair's Brief at p. 7. ^ 17. The expiration
of the coverage period terminated all future obligations owed by Trinity to Farr.
The expiration of the coverage period also terminated all future obligations owed
by Farr to Trinity. All claims against Trinity were properly dismissed.
Farr does not dispute the propriety of the trial court's judgment in Trinity's
favor. Fair's acquiescence in the propriety of the trial court's grant of a summary
judgment implicates what is often colloquially referred to as the "raise or waive"
standard: a legal decision that is made at one stage of litigation which remains
unchallenged on appeal despite the opportunity to do so becomes the law of the
case, and "the aggrieved party is deemed to have forfeited any right to challenge
that particular decision at a subsequent date." United States v. Connell. 6 F.3d 27,
30-31 (1st Cir. 1993); Langeland v. Monarch Motors. Inc.. 952 P.2d 1058 at n. 4
4

(Utah 1998) ("While federal cases are instructive, and perhaps even persuasive,
they are by no means authoritative and certainly not controlling."). Farr does,
however, challenge other holdings of the trial court that tangentially could affect
Trinity. Farr references motions made in the trial court relating to apportionment
that the trial court did not rule on.3 Fair's Brief at p. 41.
II.

THE COURT'S REMAND ORDER, IF ANY, SHOULD BE
LIMITED IN A MANNER THAT PRECLUDES REVIVAL
OF THE CLAIMS AGAINST TRINITY.

If one or more of the appealed motions was prematurely or improvidently
granted by the trial court, this Court will remit all or some of the case to the trial
court. "The word 'remand' does not have the same meaning as 'remit.' The
process by which the decision and mandate of the appellate court, along with the
circuit court record, are returned to the circuit court is referred to as remittitur."
Tietsworth v. Harlev-Davidson. Inc.. 2007 WI 97, If 90, 735 N.W.2d 418

3

Although the district court, as noted, did not explicitly deny that motion,
the entry of afinaljudgment was an implicit denial of any outstanding motions.
See, e.g.. United States v. Depew. 210 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000) (where
judgment of conviction entered, court of appeals treated district court's failure to
rule on a motion for employment of an expert witness as a denial of the motion);
Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. # 40 County of Yamhill. 130 F.3d 432, 439 & n. 5 (9th Cir.
1997) (after entry of summary judgment, court of appeals held magistrate judge's
"failure to rule on a motion is appealable" and, despite such failure to rule,
considered whether magistrate judge properly denied the motion).
5

(Abhrahamson, C.J. (dissenting)).4 "The mandate rule is merely a specific
application of the law of the case doctrine

" United States v. Aramony. 166

F.3d 655, 662 (4th Cir. 1999^: see also Red Flame. Inc. v. Martinez. 2000 UT 22,
1fl| 4-5, 996 P.2d 540 (discussing the law of the case doctrine).
"Under the mandate rule, a district court cannot reconsider issues the parties
failed to raise on appeal; the court must attempt to implement the spirit of the
mandate; and the court may not alter rulings impliedly made by the appellate
court." S. Atl. Ltd. P'ship of Tennessee. LP v. Riese. 356 F.3d 576, 584 (4th Cir.
2004). However, the mere reversal of a summary judgment means that the
underlying motion for summary judgment is denied. The denial of a motion for
summary judgment, in turn, means that nothing was decided (i.e., a trial is not
avoided). And if nothing was decided in connection with the reversed summary
judgment, UTAH R. Civ. P. 54(b) would permit the trial court to revive claims
against Trinity insofar as the trial of any issue might involve the jury's
apportionment of tort-based fault.
If the appellate court does not explicitly or implicitly decide an issue, a
4

"Commentary on appellate practice often complains that appellate
decisions are not clear regarding what, if anything, should happen when the trial
court record and the supreme court's decision are returned to the trial court.
Appellate courts are urged to spell out the consequences, if any, of a decision for
further proceedings." Id at ^ 94; see also id at n. 11.
6

judge may reexamine an earlier ruling if the trial court has a strong and reasonable
conviction that the earlier ruling was wrong, and if rescinding it would not cause
undue harm to the party that had benefitted from it. See Arizona v. California. 460
U.S. 605, 618 & n. 8 (1983). Since Trinity cannot have been held liable for any
tort under the allegations presented by Fair and the co-defendants, this Court
should explicitly set forth which parties may be held liable in tort when the facts
are viewed in the light most favorable to Fair in order to guide subsequent
proceedings. See Salt Lake Citv v. Jaramillo. 2007 UT App 32,123, 156 P.3d
839 (Orme, J. (concurring and dissenting)); Hess v. Robinson. 163 P.2d 510, 514
(Utah 1945) (Wolfe, J. (concurring in the result)).
III.

FARR' S CLAIMS AGAINST TRINITY WERE CONTRACT
FORMATION CLAIMS.

Fair brought claims that, essentially, fell into two categories — contract and
tort. The allegations relating to Trinity were purportedly negligence claims. But
the alleged "fault"5 of Trinity was premised upon promises set forth in a bilateral
contract which had expired before the Loss was suffered by Fan*. Comparative

5

"Fault" is defined in the ULRA. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-11.
7

fault only applies to tort claims. The only6 tort claims brought by Farr related to
Reed, et al.
A.

Tort Claims Against Reed.

Farr alleges professional malpractice against Reed, et al. — a tort. Fanalleges that Reed kept Trustco in the dark and is vicariously liable for Trustco's
mistake in obtaining inadequate coverage from Safeco. See generally Vina v.
Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York. 761 P.2d 581, 584-85 (Utah App. 1988)
(discussing distinctions between agents and brokers). Reed is also alleged to have
been negligent in failing to understand and/or to communicate to Farr the
distinction between the general coverage limits that would have been available to
Fair under the Truck policy and the distinct coverage limits structure contained in
the Safeco policy. Fair's Brief at p. 9. If 32.
Reed is alleged to have been required to exercise the skill of a reasonable
insurance broker, and Farr alleges that his conduct fell below that standard of care.
See, e.g.. Hermansen v. Tasulis. 2002 UT 52, f 21, 48 P.3d 235 ("[T]he

6

"Only" in the sense of claims made by Farr that could possibly relate to
actions or omissions by Trinity. Some allegations made by Farr could conceivably
implicate tort duties relating to the manner of responding to the Loss subsequent
to the Loss by the insurer defendants other than Trinity. But no view of those
claims could possibly relate to Trinity. Only the underwriting and
contract-formation allegations are even remotely relevant to Trinity.
8

information is given in the capacity of one in the business of supplying such
information, that care and diligence should be exercised which is compatible with
the particular business or profession involved. Those who deal with such persons
do so because of the advantages which they expect to derive from this special
competence. The law, therefore, may well predicate on such a relationship, the
duty of care to insure the accuracy and validity of the information."). The due care
owed to Farr by Reed arose from a duty imposed by law. See West v.
Inter-Financial. Inc.. 2006 UT App 222, U 25, 139 P.3d 1059. Reed was also
alleged to have been Fair's agent who owed fiduciary duties. See Hal Taylor
Assocs. v. Unionamerica. Inc.. 657 P.2d 743, 748 (Utah 1982) (explaining that an
agent owes fiduciary duties to the principal); C&Y Corp. v. General Biometrics.
Inc.. 896 P.2d 47 (Utah App. 1995) (analyzing the duties of agents to principals
and liability of principals for the acts of the agents). By breaching the duties
imposed by law, Reed is alleged to have proximately caused injury to Farr by
furnishing it with an insurance policy that was inadequate. The inadequacy of the
insurance policy resulted in damages when Farr discovered that its Loss was not
adequately insured.7 See, e.g.. Salt Lake City School Dist. v. Galbraith & Green.
7

Trinity assumes that Safeco's interpretation was correct, but offers no
opinion on this question because the correctness or incorrectness will be addressed
by Farr and Safeco and the answer to that question is not relevant to the claims
9

Inc.. 740 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1987) ("Because the District's obligation to Welch
arose due to Galbraith & Green's negligence, it is only fair that it should be
required to shoulder the burden."). And Reed admitted that he did not rely8 on the
Trinity policy when he advised Fair. Farr's Brief at p. 9. ^ 33.
B.

Contract Claims Against the Primary Defendants.

Farr alleges inadequate payment of insurance benefits against Safeco and
Hartford — a question of contract performance. See Interwest Constr. v. Palmer.
923 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah 1996) ("[W]e first look to the four corners of the
contract itself to determine whether it is ambiguous."); Harbor Ins. Co. v.
Continental Bank Corp.. 922 F.2d 357, 366 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Given this rule — if
there is an ambiguity, the insured wins — why would there ever be an occasion for
attempting to resolve an ambiguity in an insurance contract by evidence?").
Farr also challenges the terms of the Safeco policy because the policy was
delivered subsequent to the loss — a question relating to contract formation. It
therefore argues that the contract was not fully integrated and that the terms of the
against Trinity. See UTAH R. APP. P. 24(i).
8

If the allegations against Trinity were construed as some version of
negligent misrepresentation through the provision of a policy which did not insure
against 100% of the insured's eventual loss and which was used by a third-party as
a template (without permission or remuneration), the elements of that tort would
be unsatisfied even if the false premise were accepted as true.
10

policy should be deemed to be those terms which are consistent with Reed's
promise to procure adequate coverage for Fair's risks and subsequent Loss.
C.

Contract Claims Against the Secondary Defendants.

Fair alleges that a binder was issued by Auto-Owners — a question of
contract formation. Auto-Owners argued that it merely provided a preliminary
quote. Reed obtained a check from Fair. Reed told Farr that a policy had been
bound by Auto-Owners. Fair's Brief at p. 11. f 48. Reed's assertion was not
corroborated. (R. 3500). Kirchen told Reed that Auto-Owners declined to issue a
policy. After holding the Farr checks for a few days, Reed returned the checks to
Fair. Fair argues that Auto-Owners was obligated to cancel the bound coverage.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-303.
D.

Claims Against the Tertiary Defendants.

Finally, Farr alleged that Trinity and Blackburn Jones were comparatively at
fault because the Trinity policy was used as a point of comparison when Fanshopped around for a new policy — what Fair mischaracterizes as negligence.
Fair's Brief at pp. 40-41. As set forth above, the allegations against Trinity and
the other insurer defendants (at least insofar as those allegations relate to the

11

contract formation9 stage) sounded in contract. The allegations against Reed, et al.
sounded in tort.
A broker acting for the insured determines10 the types of coverages that will
serve the needs of a particular insured. The underwriting department of an
insurance company merely determines how much money it demands (in the form
of premiums) in exchange for the promise to accept the insured's risk of loss.
Trinity owed no duty to determine coverage levels or to provide Fair with
insurance that would cover all its potential losses. See, e.g., Culp Const. Co. v.
Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d 650 at n. 3 (Utah 1990) (discussing the distinction
between an abstractor of title and the distinct duties owed by a title insurance
company). Fair could choose to buy a policy offering more or less protection by

9

See generally Van Tassell v. Lewis, 222 P.2d 350, 356 (Utah 1950)
(Wade, J. dissenting) (explaining the distinction between consideration for a
promise and consideration for performance); Market Street Associates Ltd.
Partnership v. Frev, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The emphasis we are
placing on postcontractual versus precontractual conduct helps explain the pattern
that is observed when the duty of contractual good faith is considered in all its
variety, encompassing not only good faith in the performance of a contract but
also good faith in its formation and in its enforcement.").
10

See Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283 H 24
Modern home construction requires a high degree of knowledge and expertise,
including knowledge of soil conditions. We have found that the disparity in skill
and knowledge between home buyers and builder-contractors leads buyers to rely
on the builder-contractor's expertise.'9).
12

reference to its own desire to pay more or less money.
Even if Trinity could have owed any duties at or near the time it issued the
Trinity policy to Farr, that policy had terminated before the Loss. Trinity owed no
duties11 after the contract expired.
No legal duty allegedly owed by Trinity was ever identified. And a legal
duty, if any, would not have continued beyond the termination of the Trinity
policy under any possible theory. See SME Industries. Inc. v. Thompson.
Ventulett. Stainback and Assoc. Inc.. 2001 UT 54,f42, 28 P.3d 669 ("There is a
beneficial effect to society when contractual agreements are enforced and
expectancy interests are not frustrated. In cases involving [insurance12] disputes,
the contracts entered into among the various parties shall govern their economic
expectations. The preservation of the contract represents the most efficient and

11

See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 20041JT 34, f 26; QS
P.3d 409 ("In insurance each party must take a risk. But it is inaccurate to assert
that if the insured event does not occur then the insured receives nothing in return
for the premium payment made. Each insured receives at the time of contract
formation present assurance of compensation if the loss occurs which is a valuable
peace-of-mind protection." (citations omitted)).
12

The original word in this quote was "construction." The principle set
forth above relates to contracts without reference to the subject matter of the
contracts. The underlying premise of the economic loss rule considered in that
case might arguably vary depending on the subject matter of the contracts, but that
distinction is not relevant as the quote is used here. Therefore, the substitution of
terms is not misleading and does not render the quote inapt.
13

fair manner in which to limit liability and govern expectations in the [insurance]
business.").
IV.

THE SOURCE OF THE DUTY DOCTRINE GOVERNS THE
LEGAL THEORIES THAT ARE NECESSARY FOR
PROPER ADJUDICATION OF THIS APPEAL.

The boundary and interplay between tort law and contract law can often be
obscure. See Grynberg v. Ouestar Pipeline Co.. 2003 UT 8, H 42 ("[Successful
separation of contract and tort law requires identification of the underlying duties
governing the parties' relationship."). As to Trinity, the line is bright and
well-defined. "Contractual duties exist by mutual agreement of the parties, while
tort duties exist by imposition of society; the modern focus is not on the harm that
occurs but instead is on the source of the duty that was breached." kL
A review of several basic principles is necessary in order to adequately
analyze Trinity's entitlement to a specific remand order that precludes revival of
any claims against Trinity if a portion of Farr's claims is remanded. The trial court
applied the correct standard when it granted Trinity's Motion for Summary
Judgment. See, e ^ , Pearce v. Utah Athletic Foundation. 2008 UT 13, f 25
("Without the applicable standard of care, it was impossible for the district court to
determine the degree to which the ski resort's conduct deviated from the standard

14

of care . . . . " ) .
An example of a simple bilateral contract for the sale of a chattel may help
elucidate the proper standards to be applied in this case. See First American
Commerce Co. v. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank. 743 P.2d 1193,1194 (Utah 1987)
("A review of basic contract law vocabulary is helpful to a resolution of the
issue."). The simple sale of a chattel can give rise to causes of action sounding in
contract and causes of action sounding in tort.
CONTRACT FORMATION
A judge desires to sell a gavel to an attorney. The judge promises to give
possession and ownership of the gavel to the attorney. The attorney promises to
give $100 to the judge within 30 seconds of the judge's performance. The meeting
of the minds as to all material terms and consideration supporting formation of the
contract (the mutual promises) are sufficient to form a legally-binding contract.
LACK OF CONSIDERATION / INDEFINITE /MUTUALITY OF ASSENT
A judge desires to sell a gavel to an attorney. The judge promises to give
ownership of the gavel to the attorney in exchange for $100. The attorney
promises to give the judge $100 if his gavel appraiser determines13 that the gavel is
13

Prince. Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young. 2004 UT 26, f 14 ("Such
statements "neither bind[] the person making [them]... nor function[] as
consideration for a return promise." (citations omitted)).
15

worth at least $100. The gavel appraiser provides his opinion that the gavel is
only worth $5. The attorney gives the gavel back to the judge. The attorney
refuses to give $100 to the judge. The judge cannot enforce14 his claim to receive
$100 for the gavel.
CONTRACT PERFORMANCE
The judge gently hands the gavel to the attorney. The judge's performance
of his obligation under the contract constitutes consideration for the attorney's
reciprocal performance. The attorney's performance is clear and explicit. It is due
within 30 seconds.15 If the attorney pays $100 to the judge when payment is due,
the contract was performed16 according to its terms.

14

Wells Fargo Bank v. Temple View Investments. 2003 UT App 441, 82
P.3d 655 ("Where, as here, '[pjroof of mutual assent is absent, 'we will not give
legal force to a party's 'attempt to unilaterally alter' the terms of the note. Western
Sur. Co. v. Murphy, 754 P.2d 1237, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Thus, we
conclude 'the trial court correctly ruled that the [purported extension] had no force
or effect.' /J.").
15

After consideration for performance is provided by the party whose duty
to perform is first in time, the contract is "executory." The only thing left to do is
for the party whose performance is second in time to provide the reciprocal
consideration according to the terms of the contract. See SME Industries. Inc. v.
Thompson. Ventulett. Stainback and Assoc. Inc.. 2001 UT 54, f 11, 28 P.3d 669
(discussing executory status of a contract in the context of assignability).
16

Guardian Title Co. Of Utah v. Mitchell. 2002 UT 63, 54 P.3d 130
("Where one party fails to satisfy the obligations it has undertaken, it has breached
the contract, and it cannot defend itself by claiming either (1) that the other party's
16

SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE
The judge tosses the gavel to the attorney. The attorney fumbles the gavel.
He bends over and picks up the gavel. The attorney performs within 30 seconds.
The attorney pays the $100 to the judge because the delivery, though not precisely
as planned, was not a material breach of the judge's duty of performance.17
FAILURE OF A CONDITION PRECEDENT
The judge demands to get paid $100 before he will perform. Because the
judge refuses to perform the condition precedent to payment, the attorney is not
obligated to pay $100 to the judge because the judge refuses'8 to provide the
consideration for performance identified in the parties' agreement.19
FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION
The judge gives the attorney an old gavel that his dog chewed up. Since it
is not the gavel the attorney agreed to purchase for $100, the attorney does not
negligence exceeded its own or (2) that an illegal act of its employee prevented it
from fulfilling its obligations.").
17

"A breach of express contract claim arises out of the express terms of the
contract, and the breach is proven in relation to those terms." Christiansen v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange. 116 P.3d 259, 2005 UT 21, \ 10 (citations omitted).
18

Bonneville Distributing Company v. Green River Development
Associates. Inc.. 2007 UT App 175, U 32 (setting forth the first-breach rule).
19

See Campbell. Maack & Sessions v. Debry. 2001 UT App 397, 38 P.3d
984,991.
17

owe performance.
BADFAITH20
The judge hands the gavel to the attorney. The attorney refuses to perform
based on his recital of a string of tautologies21 and platitudes and/or his suggestion
that additional performance22 is due from the judge. The attorney is liable for bad

20

The elements are (1) that the insurer failed to properly investigate the
claim or to subject the results of the investigation to a cognitive evaluation and
review and (2) that the insurer breached the contract for insurance coverage with
the insured when it refused to pay the insured's claim. An insurer has the
responsibility to marshal all of the pertinent facts with regard to its insured's claim
before denying coverage. Since recklessness does not include any mens rea
element, an arguable reason does not defeat the bad faith claim. Mutual Service
Cas. Ins. co. v. Henderson. 368 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2004) (applying Alabama law
and the "normal" vs. "abnormal" distinctions which resemble Utah's "first party"
vs. "third party" distinctions and setting forth elements of each).
21

"An examination of express contract terms alone is insufficient to
determine whether there has been a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. S. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to
Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 369, 371 (1980). To comply with his
obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a party's actions must be consistent
with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 comment a (1981). The purpose,
intentions, and expectations of the parties should be determined by considering the
contract language and the course of dealings between and conduct of the parties."
St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital. 811 P.2d 194, 200
(Utah 1991).
22

Judge Easterbrook observed: "A person who accepts a 'non-negotiable'
offer of $50,000 salary would be laughed out of court if she filed suit for an extra
$ 10,000, contending that the employer's refusal to negotiate made the deal
'unconscionable' and entitled her to better terms." Oblix. Inc. v. Winiecki. 374
18

faith including general damages ($100), special damages and consequential
damages.
WEIGHING CONSIDERA TION
The judge hands the gavel to the attorney. The attorney looks at the gavel
and announces that the gavel is not really worth $100. He suggests that a trial is
necessary23 to determine the "true" value of the gavel.24 The attorney refuses to
perform within 30 seconds. The attorney breached the contract. His liability for
general damages i s $ 100.

F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2004).
23

When a party takes a voluntary action to perform an action that is distinct
from any action governed by the parties' contract such as demanding a trial to
interpret terms of a fully-integrated contract, tort duties may be imposed by law.
Alder v. Baver Corp.. 2002 UT 115,126 (adopting § 324A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts); Cullum v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 857 P.2d 922 (Utah
1993) (holding that the purpose of section 31A-21-106 "is to ensure that the entire
insurance contract is contained in one document so that the insured can determine
from the policy exactly what coverage he or she has." Id at 925); Draughon v.
CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc. 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989) ("The interpretation
of an integrated, unambiguous contract is a question of law, and, accordingly, we
give no particular deference to the trial court's interpretation." (citations omitted));
Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 817 P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1991).
24

"That amounts to the frivolous argument that to prove a breach of
contract the plaintiff cannot rely on what the contract says but must prove that
every term corresponds to some true fact in the world." Employers Ins. of Wausau
v. Titan Intern.. Inc.. 400 F.3d 486,490 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Campbell. Maack &
Sessions v. Debry. 38 P.3d 984, 991 (Utah App. 2001)).
19

NEGLIGENCE
The judge winds up and throws the gavel at the attorney. The attorney is
blinded as a result of the gavel hitting him in the eye. The judge has not breached
the contract. The judge has substantially performed his duties owed under the
contract. The attorney possesses the consideration and is obligated to provide the
reciprocal consideration. The reciprocal consideration of $100 must be paid to the
judge.
But the judge has violated his duty of due care owed to the attorney. The
judge is liable in tort. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 701 P.2d 795, n. 3 (Utah 1985)
("We recognize that in some cases the acts constituting a breach of contract may
also result in breaches of duty that are independent of the contract and may give
rise to causes of action in tort.").
V.

THE HARTFORD DENIAL OF FARR' S CLAIM WAS
ADEQUATE.

A helpful starting point for distinguishing between the various duties owed
by the various parties is the Hartford denial of Fair's claim. Hartford adjusted the
Fair claim for Safeco. Its denial letter was sufficient25 because it put Farr on
25

"Before the contract is signed, the parties confront each other with a
natural wariness. Neither expects the other to be particularly forthcoming, and
therefore there is no deception when one is not. Afterwards the situation is
20

notice of the specific provisions which were contained in the policy. Safeco
gave notice of the terms upon which the refusal to pay the claim was based.27 The
Hartford denial is insufficient if it were a coverage opinion from a qualified
attorney, but it is sufficiently specific as a denial letter. Neither claims adjusters
nor insurance brokers should be held to the same standard expected of attorneys
who provide coverage opinions. But claims adjusters and insurance brokers are
similarly situated. They are both required to provide information with a high
degree of specificity to enable insureds to make decisions. The broker's

different. The parties are now in a cooperative relationship the costs of which will
be considerably reduced by a measure of trust. So each lowers his guard a bit, and
now silence is more apt to be deceptive." Market Street Associates Ltd.
Partnership v. Frev. 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991).
26

The Insurance Commissioner has determined that an insurer's denial is
unfair, misleading, deceptive, unfairly discriminatory or overreaching whenever its
denial is founded upon: "any reason which is not clearly described in the policy as
a reason for such denial...." R590-190-8(l); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46a-16.
27

General Accident Insurance Group v. Cirucci. 387 N.E.2d 223, 46
N.Y.2d 862 (NY App. 1979) ("Although an insurer may disclaim coverage for a
valid reason, the notice of disclaimer must promptly apprise the claimant with a
high degree of specificity of the ground or grounds on which the disclaimer is
predicated. Absent such specific notice, a claimant might have difficulty assessing
whether the insurer will be able to disclaim successfully. This uncertainty could
prejudice the claimant's ability to ultimately obtain recovery. In addition, the
insurer's responsibility to furnish notice of the specific ground on which the
disclaimer is based is not unduly burdensome, the insurer being highly
experienced and sophisticated in such matters.").
21

obligation is performed during the negotiation for the formation of a contract
between the insured and the insurer. And the claims adjuster's obligation is
performed after the insured suffers a loss.
The analysis contained in the denial letter is consistent with what Reed
should have known when he was attempting to place coverage for Fair. If the
Court understands the explanation provided by Hartford, it can appreciate the level
of explanation that is owed by a broker to his principal.
VI.

TRINITY NEVER WARRANTED THAT IT WOULD
PROVIDE COVERAGE FOR ALL FARR'S RISKS OF LOSS.

When an insurance company issues a policy, it does not warrant that every
risk will be covered. Instead, it promises the named insured that it will honor the
specific promises set forth within the four corners of the policy. Those promises
may only be conditioned on the terms contained in the policy. By the same token,
any and all other statements and negotiations that led to the issuance of the policy
are considered parol evidence.
Since an underwriter, unlike a broker, does not provide advice to
prospective insureds, the performance of an underwriter's obligation does not give
rise to a situation in which the contract obligations merge with tort obligations.
Even if such a scenario were possible under some theoretical set of facts (e.g.,
22

discriminatory practices), no allegations against Trinity in this case could give rise
to any tort.
A commercial policy is inherently different from a policy issued by a
personal-lines carrier for automobile insurance pursuant to a statutory mandate.,
One of the justifications for making auto insurance mandatory was the premise
that insureds could compare auto policies based on nothing more than the price
term. Since all policies are required by law to provide the same benefits, at least
in theory, average motorists can base their decisions on nothing but price and do
not need brokers to identify the insured's individual needs and an appropriate
policy therefor. That standardization places all auto insurers on a level playing
field permitting the invisible hand of competition to reduce premiums. And the
mandatory statutory provisions, at least in theory, reduce the transaction costs
associated with a motorist's legal duty to purchase auto insurance by eliminating
unnecessary intermediaries — such as brokers — and by eliminating unscrupulous
insurers that could distort the market by providing less than what the legislature
mandated.
Insurance is the transfer of risk from an insured to an insurer. If the insurer
accepts more risk, it is likely to charge a higher premium. If an insured makes a
conscious decision to retain some risk and therefore save money on premiums, that
23

rational business decision will be reflected in the price term charged for the
insurance contract. No authority is presented by any of the parties to this appeal
that a third-party can or should rely on the price term of an expired policy to
determine the risks confronted by Farr or the proper balance between insured risk
and retained risk.
To the contrary, Reed admitted that such reliance would not be appropriate.
In other words, Trinity's issuance of its policy was not a representation that it
would accept all of Fair's risks or that the balance struck in the Trinity policy was
the best allocation of risk between the parties. Since Trinity's underwriters'
decision to cover specific risks for a specific price was not plausibly a
representation that it would accept all risks for the same price, no legal duty to
Farr could plausibly be imposed on Trinity under any theory.
VII. WHETHER REED'S LEGAL DUTIES WERE A DEFENSE
OR PART OF FARR'S PRIMA FACIE CASE HAS
NOTHING TO DO WITH TRINITY.
Safeco's interpretation of its policy might be legal error. The
characterization by the trial court of the relationships between the various agents
and brokers might be legal error. But no argument has been presented that
Trinity's underwriting decisions (or those of the other insurer defendants'

24

underwriters) are properly weighed against the legal duties that are owed by
brokers and agents.
If Reed did not properly inform Fair of the risks it was retaining, either Fair
must prove that such an omission constituted the breach of his legal and/or
contractual duties or Reed must prove an affirmative defense.28 The relationship
between Fair and Reed (which includes the appropriate characterization of the
legal effect of the BOR) has nothing to do with the expired Trinity policy.
Underwriters do not make any representation to the insured (much less to
unknown third-parties in future transactions) except that the insurer issuing the
policy will honor the promises made in the contract in exchange for the premium.
The premium is based on its analysis of the risks transferred at the time the policy
was issued (i.e., consideration supporting formation of the integrated contract).
"[W]hen properly understood in context, [the allegations and the facts viewed in

28

Along analogous lines, Professors Prosser and Keeton observe: "If an
express agreement exempting the defendant from liability for his negligence is to
be sustained, it must appear that its terms were brought home to the plaintiff; and
if he did not know of the provision in his contract, and a reasonable person in his
position would not have known it, it is not binding upon him, and the agreement
fails for want of mutual assent. It is also necessary that the expressed terms of the
agreement be applicable to the particular misconduct of the defendant, and the
courts have strictly construed the terms of exculpatory clauses against the
defendant who is usually the draftsman." Prosser & Keeton on Torts (5th ed.
1984) Assumption of Risk, ch. 11, § 68, pp. 483-484.
25

the light most favorable to Farr are] simply insufficient to create a dispute of
material, i.e., legally significant, fact." Smith v. Hales & Warner Construction.
Inc.. 2005 UT App 38, If 18 (Orme, J. (concurring)).
VIII. A REMAND ORDER ANALYZING THE LEGAL
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE NUMEROUS PARTIES
WILL PROMOTE JUDICIAL ECONOMY.
Depending on the Court's analysis of the relationships between the parties,
the nature of the duties owed, the burdens placed on each of the parties, and the
materiality of certain facts when viewed through the resulting syllogisms, the trial
court's ruling may be reversed in whole or in part. Without a remand order
specifying the future needs of this litigation, if any, the trial court would have
discretion to place Trinity on the special verdict form.
Such discretion would be permissible under the law of the case doctrine, but
it would be legal error to permit such discretion since Trinity did not owe any
legal duty to Farr or any of the defendants. If a remand order specifies that Trinity
owed no duties, the mandate rule will bind the trial court and properly limit its
discretion to revive the claims against Trinity. The result sought by Trinity is in
the best interests of the judicial system and would eliminate unnecessary litigation
for Trinity on remand, if any.

26

CONCLUSION
Trinity requests that the Court explicitly rule that it owed no legal duties
under any theory advanced by Farr or the other defendants. Since no legal duty
was owed by Trinity to any of the parties, apportionment of fault at trial, if any,
cannot include Trinity.
DATED this
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